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Abstract 
The research estimates a competing risk model of mortgage terminations on a sample of UK 
securitized subprime mortgages. We consider whether the variety of mortgage contracts 
that were securitized explains the performance of subprime securities and their supposed 
‘idiosyncratic’ behaviour. The methodological advance is the use of a general, flexible 
modelling of unobserved heterogeneity over several dimensions, controlling for both 
selection issues involving mortgage choice and dynamic selection over time. We conclude 
that securities consisting of subprime loans can be given meaningful valuations on bank 
balance sheets if the performance of the different types of loans can be better understood.  
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The Performance of UK Securitized Subprime Mortgage Debt: ‘Idiosyncratic’ 
Behaviour or Mortgage Design? 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The paper reports the results of estimating a model of default and prepayment behaviour 
with competing risk and unobserved heterogeneity, using a sample of securitized United 
Kingdom (UK) subprime mortgages originated before the financial difficulties of 2007 and 
subsequently held by a global investment bank. We consider whether the variety of types of 
mortgage that were securitized including discounted debt, fixed mortgage interest rates 
(typically fixed for two or three years), and self certified  (that is low or zero documentation) 
mortgages significantly influenced the default and prepayment behaviour of securitized 
subprime loans.  Given the conventional wisdom that these securities are idiosyncratic and 
difficult to value this is an important question. Is the variation in loan performance between 
pools of subprime mortgage debt not only attributable to the contracts contained in the 
securities, but also the selectivity surrounding such choices? The broader puzzle is why such 
a variety of contracts were securitized and whether such contract variety is conducive to 
securitisation? 
The motivation for the research is the recent credit crisis and its legacy. The ‘aggressive’ 
extension of mortgage lending to subprime borrowers leading to losses on pools of 
subprime debt are seen as the proximate causes of the global credit crunch that began in 
2007. The analysis of the loan performance of quits from mortgage pools of United States 
(US) prime borrowers, and to some extent subprime mortgage holders, are reported 
elsewhere (Alexander et al, 2002; Chomsisengphet and Pennington Cross, 2004; Courchane 
et al, 2004; Cowan and Cowan, 2004; Danis and Pennington Cross, 2008; Stephens and 
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Quigars, 2008) and report a variety of results concerning the effects of different contract 
design on loan performance, and the influence of  variables representing the value of 
embedded  options in a mortgage contract. Our work adds to this literature, covering 
mortgages originated and held in a more recent time period (2001-2008). This sample 
period is of interest in its own right, since a conventional explanation for the recent financial 
crisis orginates with the performance of subprime loans. An analysis of subprime loan 
performance is important for better understanding the nature and causes of the financial 
crisis.  
The methodology of the research allows an extension of the modelling of behaviour beyond 
the data typically available to the securitisers. Unobserved individual influences, that is 
unobserved heterogeneity, would appear to be an obvious source of variation in 
loan/security performance and the basis of idiosyncratic behaviour. This paper adds to 
current research by introducing a general and flexible modelling of this heterogeneity over 
the relevant two dimensions of default and prepayment behaviour. This approach provides 
a framework capturing both the selection issues arising from initial mortgage choices, and 
the dynamic selection effects arising from changes in the population of individuals who 
remain in the pool of mortgages at each discrete point in time.  
To our knowledge, there is no econometric work on subprime loan performance for the 
United Kingdom which is comparable with that undertaken for the United States mortgage 
market. This is a major omission given the extent to which UK mortgages were securitized, 
together with the variety of and distinctive contractual features of UK housing debt (see 
Leece, 2004; Miles, 2005). The Bank of England estimated that the stock of outstanding non 
conforming securitized debt in the UK to be £39billion (Bank of England, 2008). An 
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understanding of the factors underpinning UK subprime loan performance, and the 
problematic nature of pricing risk on these securities, contributes to the debates on 
valuation; on future requirements of any reinvigorated securitized mortgage market; on 
mortgage contract design; on risk management; and on financial regulation.  
The paper begins with a review of the academic literature on the default and prepayment 
behaviour of mortgage loans and subprime loans where applicable. This is followed by an 
outline of the econometric methodology and the modelling approach to unobserved 
heterogeneity. The sample and the empirical specification of the model are discussed in the 
section which follows. Parameter estimates are then reported and analysed.  
2. DEFAULT AND PREPAYMENT  
This section of the paper presents the key theoretical and empirical approaches adopted in 
the mortgage loan performance literature and positions the research in relation to that 
work. The discussion facilitates the identification of the key influences upon default and 
prepayment behaviour which informs the empirical model that follows. 
The research into subprime loan performance  emphasizes: the influence of  contract 
features  such as prepayment penalties and reduced documentation upon the probability of 
foreclosure (Quercia, Stegman and Davis, 2005; Rose, 2008); the effect on default rates of 
originating loans from third parties (Alexander et al, 2002; Pennington Cross, 2003); and 
how default rates vary by loan classification (Cowan and Cowan, 2004). Econometric 
specifications and results in the research of the subprime market tend to reflect the 
research into the behaviour of prime mortgage loans, with the co-variates for subprime 
debt having larger marginal effects on the default and/or repayment probabilities 
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(Pennington Cross and Chomsisengphet, 2007). Thus the empirical modelling also draws 
upon the wider mortgage loan performance literature. 
Option Theoretic and Empirical Prepayment Models 
The literature on the options embedded in mortgage contracts and their impact upon loan 
performance is well established, both theoretically and empirically (Kau et al, 1993; Deng et 
al, 2000; Ambrose and LaCour-Little, 2001; Ambrose and Sanders, 2003). The possibility of 
defaulting on a loan is treated as a put option (selling the house back) while prepayment is 
considered as a call option (buying back the mortgage). The analysis is to some extent 
United States specific, for example in the UK the borrower retains liability for the 
outstanding mortgage debt on default (Leece, 2004),  i.e. the put option may not be so 
valuable.  The prepayment option also applies more readily to long term fixed interest rate 
mortgages more typical of the US (Leece, 2004).  However, short term fixed rates and 
periods were the interest rate is discounted, but eventually reverts to an higher rate, 
provide boundary conditions for valuing the call option (Kau, 1993). 
Previous work suggests that borrowers do not always take systematic advantage of the 
embedded options they hold, such as not prepaying when favourable alternative contracts 
are available (the call option is in the money) or not defaulting when the put option is well 
into the money. This has led to several developments. One is to estimate empirical 
prepayment models that recognise the importance of exogenous effects (surprises) on 
default and prepayment behaviour, for example the effect of payment shocks (Quigley and 
Van Order, 1990, 1995; Archer and Ling, 1993). In particular some work has focused on 
studying loan level data where borrower characteristics can be analysed. Furthermore, the 
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literature has further emphasized the role of unobserved heterogeneity among borrowers 
(Deng and Quigley, 2002; Alexander et al, 2002). 
The majority of recent empirical studies of mortgage loan performance now incorporate 
modelling of both the embedded options in mortgage contracts and variables typical of 
empirical prepayment models. There is also a recognition that the embedded options 
represent a competing risk in that the exercise of one option precludes the exercise of the 
other (Deng et al, 2000; Lambrecht et al, 2006). The research reported in this paper uses 
loan level data and estimates an empirical model of mortgage default and prepayment 
which incorporates both an option theoretic specification and includes variables that impact 
upon affordability, or reflect exogeneous shocks. The study is unusual in incorporating a 
wide variety of mortgage contracts in the sample which makes explicit issues regarding 
selection bias which have not been treated in previous work looking at single types of 
contract.  
Mortgage Design 
The mortgage contracts studied in the US are typically fixed rate mortgages with the interest 
rate fixed for 15 or 30 years, and adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) where the rate of 
interest changes annually. This compares to UK mortgage contracts where the majority have 
interest rates fixed for one to three years or the interest rate changes at irregular periods (a 
variable rate mortgage). The UK one year fixed rate contracts are similar to the US 
adjustable rate mortgage and the two to three year interest rate fixes are equivalent to the 
so called ‘hybrid mortgage’ in the US (see Ambrose et al, 2005). The details of these 
contracts can have an impact upon prepayment and/or default behaviour, for example 
prepayment penalties (Pereira et al, 2002).  
8 
 
There is evidence for the United States that adjustable rate mortgages prepay at a faster 
rate than fixed rate mortgages (Ambrose and LaCourLittle, 2001). Households holding 
adjustable rate mortgages may be more mobile than those with fixed rate contracts and will 
start refinancing after a short period of time (Brueckner, 1995). Borrowers choosing a 
discounted mortgage may chase new (better) deals.  Thirdly ARM borrowers may refinance 
into fixed rate mortgages on the reset date, depending upon interest rate expectations. 
Hence discounted mortgage holders will tend to have a higher likelihood of prepayment 
than fixed rate mortgage holders. The payment shock which arises around the date of 
adjustment of ARM interest rates might induce a higher level of mortgage defaults 
(Ambrose et al, 2005). A similar phenomenon takes place with UK short term fixed rate 
debt. 
The mortgage contracts  featuring  in the current research involve self-certification, 
discounting, fixed rate contracts, and dates at which the interest rate on the contract 
reverts from a favourable rate of interest back to an higher index rate (typically London 
Interbank Offered Rate, LIBOR) plus margin (reset dates). The real estate economics and 
finance literature has examined the effects of these different aspects of contract design on 
the performance of mortgage loans (Phillips et al, 1996; Vanderhoff, 1996; Green and 
Shilling, 1997; Ambrose and LaCour-Little, 2001). The majority of papers have considered 
the effect of discounting the initial interest rate (teaser rates). The empirical results have 
been mixed and contradictory. Later work should be credited with the use of a competing 
risk framework and controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Ambrose and LaCour-Little  
(2001) apply this methodology and find a significant increase in prepayments at adjustment 
dates.  
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A further key feature of recent mortgage contracts has been low or zero documentation in 
the US and its equivalent the self certified mortgage in the UK1.  This relaxed approach to 
mortgage underwriting attenuates or overrides prudential lending criteria and introduces 
information asymmetry, with the lender knowing less about the borrower’s ability to pay 
and likelihood of default. There may be substantial adverse selection and borrowers may 
exhibit opportunistic behaviour (Brueckner, 2000; Leece, 2004). As a consequence self-
certification will have a positive effect on the likelihood of defaulting. There is very little 
research in this area, an exception is Rose (2008) who estimates a multinomial logit model 
with unobserved heterogeneity using securitized  subprime  loans for the Chicago 
Metropolitan area from January 1999 and up to mid 20032. Rose finds that the effects of 
variables on foreclosure depend upon loan features such as the level of documentation. 
A key motivation for researching the impact of contract designs on loan performance is the 
question of which loans should be securitized and how such securities would be valued. 
Until recently, adjustable rate and other mortgage designs were less likely to have been 
securitized than long term fixed rate contracts (Ambrose and La-Cour Little, 2001). 
Furthermore, loan contracts which exhibit complex and less predictable default and 
repayment rates may be less suitable for securitisation. Research to date has typically 
controlled for different contract designs by analysing loans of a given type (typically long 
term fixed or adjustable rate). Even analysing one type of loan raises issues regarding 
                                                          
1
 Self-certified mortgages are designed for self-employed or employed individuals with uncertain incomes or 
incomes from multiple sources. These contracts may therefore also proxy this income uncertainty. There are 
also claims that self certification was used as an avoidance of due diligence and prudential lending; lending to 
households on social benefits, or with implausible income statements. In 2008 52% of all new mortgages were 
self certified (Financial Services Authority, 2010). 
2
 Rose controls for unobserved heterogeneity with the use of robust standard errors which allows for 
clustering in loans. This differs from our generalised modelling of unobserved heterogeneity and analysis of 
correlations between unobserved heterogeneity for the two forms of exit, and survival. 
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selectivity (i.e. the borrowers associated with a particular loan specie may share observed or 
unobserved characteristics which may increase  a specific risk). When several types of 
mortgage are pooled in the same security then the heterogeneity of these specific risk may 
multiply. The research reported in this paper addresses the selectivity that arises from the 
individual specific factors that generate the initial choice of contract type by modelling these 
factors as unobserved heterogeneity. We subsequently evaluate the effect of mortgage 
contract choice upon both default and prepayment behaviour in a competing risk 
framework.   
3. ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION 
The use of econometric techniques in the mortgage loan literature has evolved from the use 
of qualitative dependent variable models to the application of Cox Proportional Hazard 
(CPH) and Multinomial Logit models (MNL) to incorporate competing risks. Further 
developments have recognised the potential importance of unobserved heterogeneity, 
particularly when modelling behaviour which from an option theoretic viewpoint appears 
sub optimal (Deng et al, 2000, 2002). The MNL has the advantage over CPH that the 
competing probabilities sum to unity modelling competing risk explicitly, because one risk is 
at the expense of the other, but it has the disadvantage of assuming the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives. There has been a tendency to favour the multinomial logit model 
with modifications to allow for the correlation between specific unobserved components, 
for example see Pennington-Cross and Chomsisengphet (2007). 
The econometric methodology advances the literature in several ways. Firstly, we model 
unobserved heterogeneity as a continuous distribution, rather than estimating parameters 
for an arbitrary number of mass points that shift the base line hazard. Though there have 
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been some plausible a-priori categorisations of groupings of unobserved heterogeneity for 
example: employment history; changes in marital status; household mobility (Clapp et al, 
2006)- a specification that uses a more general form can cover a wide number of dimensions 
(unobserved attributes and selectivity) and is more flexible. There are also likely to be 
sources of selectivity bias in the choice of type of mortgage and other mortgage choices 
made by households (Nichols et al, 2005). The econometric methodology treats unobserved 
heterogeneity as a determinant for this selectivity. 
The model presented here also allows for correlation between the sources of unobserved 
heterogeneity that effect the various decisions (to remain current, to default or to prepay). 
Though this has been used in a limited number of studies it is generally used in the context 
of the Cox Proportional Hazard model (see Alexander et al, 2002). It has been suggested 
that modelling unobserved heterogeneity with a more general functional form is too time 
consuming/expensive and is not available in commercial software (Clapp et al, 2006). 
Though the empirical models could be viewed as parsimonious this research speeds up 
estimation and facilitates convergence of the likelihood function by using the methodology 
of Train (2003) and the adaptation by Lanot (2008). For an outline of the estimation 
procedure see Appendix A.  
Overview 
We wish to model the individual (discrete time) history of the decisions of default or early 
repayment, { } 1iTit td = , jointly or conditionally  on the history of a set of time dependent 
regressors, say { } 1iTit tx = . Here we think of t as the history time and not the calendar time. iT  
is the first of three possible times, either it is the date when the individual decides to repay 
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or decides to default, or it is the end of the observation period. itd  can take three possible 
values: 1 if the individual decides to keep paying the mortgage in period t, 2 if the individual 
“decides” to default and 3 if the individual decides to repay the mortgage early.  
Furthermore, we wish to account for the difference at the time of contracting between 
mortgage/contract type and initial characteristics of the loan, say 0,i ic x  with ic  is 
potentially a vector of qualitative variables indicating the type of contract chosen, while 0ix  
measures the more quantitative aspects of the loan (the amount borrowed, the value of the 
property on which the loan is based, etc). For example, it seems natural to distinguish 
between certificated mortgage and self certificated mortgages and/or between fixed and 
variable mortgages.  
Finally we wish to account for unobserved differences between individuals which may affect 
both ”exit” decisions independently or jointly. Hence we denote ( )1 2,i i iε ε ε≡  the vector of 
unobserved individual factors. We assume that the marginal joint distribution of iε  is 
normal with means 0, unit variances and zero correlation. We discuss later on how this 
specification captures the likely dependence between the two individual factors. 
Assumptions 
Firstly, we discuss the general assumptions we wish to maintain to estimate the parameters 
of interest. In general, given a set of initial exogenous variables, say 0iw , we can always 
express the probability density of a given history in the following general fashion; Equation 
(1): 
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d x c x w it it i i i it t
f c x x d w
f w f c x w f x c x w
f d x c x w
ε ε ε
ε
ε
ε ε ε
ε
= =
=
= =
=
   (1)
 
 
This decomposes the joint density of all the quantities of interest into a product of marginal 
and conditional densities. We denote by f
s
 each density, and the subscript indicates the 
identity (its argument and the set of conditioning variables) of each density. 
For practical and computational reasons the restriction on the conditional distribution of the 
time varying covariates represented by Equation (2) is maintained: 
{ }( ) { }( )0 0 0 0| , , , 0 0 | , , 0 01 1| , , , | , ,i iT Tx c x w it i i i i x c x w it i i it tf x c x w f x c x wε ε= == ,   (2) 
All the information contained in the individual specific effect iε  is captured by the the initial 
value of the characteristics of the loan, 0ix  , and the type of loan ic . This assumption is 
plausible in fact since it suggests that the regressor’s history from time 1 onward is 
independent from the individual specific effect conditional on the initial characteristics of 
the loan 0,i ic x  and the predetermined variables 0iw . This implies that we believe the 
evolution of the time varying covariate is mostly determined outside of the individual time 
invariant circumstances and/or decisions (this means that conditional on the choice of 
interest rate the joint distribution of future interest rates is independent of individual 
specific unobserved components).  
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Contract Choices, Selectivity and Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Conditioning on the individual specific factors in the description of the distributions of the 
initial characteristics of the individual loan contracts allows us to specify the dependence 
between the initial characteristics and the outcome of interest, i.e. the timing and the 
nature of the exit decisions. This provides a “natural” parametrisation for the (dynamic) 
selection effects we would expect to observe. In principle we are able to evaluate quantities 
such as the distribution of the duration until defaults/repayment given the observed initial 
characteristics or the distribution of the expected time to default/repayment given the 
observed initial characteristics. The introduction of the unobserved component allow for a 
more “flexible” correlation structure between the diverse elements of the models. In 
particular it is more flexible than a comparable specification (with the factor loadings for the 
individual specific effect set to 0) which would rely only on conditional independence.  
The density of the initial observed characteristics of the loan is assumed to be jointly 
normally distributed with a mean vector depending linearly on iε  and a constant variance 
covariance (although it would be feasible to make the variance covariance matrix 
dependent on some exogenous observed characteristics as well as dependent on the 
individual specific effects in iε ). This assumption is formally presented by Expression (3). 
 ( )0 0 00 0 0 1 1 2 2| , ~ ,i i i i i ix w N wε ε εΚ + ∆ + ∆ Σ ,      (3) 
where 0Κ  is a parameter matrix and  01∆  and 02∆  are parameters vector conformable to the 
dimensions of 0ix . Σ  is the variance-covariance matrix for 0ix  given 0iw  and iε . 
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We assume that the probability density of the mortgage type is of the logit or multinomial 
logit form in the various dimensions of choice (i.e. certification on the one hand and interest 
rate choice); Equations (4) and (5). Firstly, in the case of the certification choice we assume 
that the probability is:  
 
( ) ( )( )1 0 0| , , 0 0 1 1 1 10 0 0 0 1 1 2 2
10 | , ,
1 expc x w i i i i i i i
f x w
x w
ε ε
α κ δ ε δ ε
=
+ − + + +
,   (4) 
 
( ) ( )
1 0 0 1 0 0| , , 0 0 | , , 0 01 | , , 1 0 | , ,c x w i i i c x w i i if x w f x wε εε ε= − .     (5) 
 
Since there are three potential choices for the interest rate choice (fixed, discount or Libor), 
given the certification choice we assume that probabilities take the form of Equation (6). 
( )
( )
( )
2
2 1 0| , , 2 1 0 0 3
1
| , , , i
i
Z c
c c x i i i i
Z k
k
ef c c x w
e
ε ε
=
=
∑
, with c
2
 in {1,2,3},    (6) 
Where: 
( )
( )
( )
2 2 2 2 2
2 1 0 2 0 2 21 1 22 2
2 2 2 2 2
3 1 0 3 0 3 31 1 32 2
1 0,
2 ,
3 .
i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
Z
Z c x w
Z c x w
λ α κ δ ε δ ε
λ α κ δ ε δ ε
=
= + + + +
= + + + +
 
In some cases one of the three options (option 3) is not available at a particular time, and 
the model above collapses to a simple binary logit model. 
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Estimation 
Equation (7) represents the assumption that the conditional joint likelihood of the history of 
decisions can be decomposed into a product of conditional probabilities: 
{ } { }( ) { }( )
( )
0 0 0 0
0 0
| , , , , 0 0 | , , , , 0 01 1 1
1
| , , , , 0 0
1
| , , , , | , , , , ,
| , , , , , .
i
i i i
i
T
T T T
d x c x w it it i i i i d x c x w it it i i i it t t
t
T
d x c x w it it i i i i
t
f d x c x w f d x c x w t
f d x c x w t
ε ε
ε
ε ε
ε
= = =
=
=
=
=
∏
∏
 (7) 
 
Practically we assume that each probability ( )
0 0| , , , , 0 0| , , , , ,d x c x w it it i i i if d x c x w tε ε  is of the 
multinomial logit form; Equation (8): 
( )
( )
( )0 0| , , , , 0 0 3
1
| , , , , , it
it
V d
d x c x w it i i i i
V k
k
ef d x c x w t
e
ε ε
=
=
∑
, with d in {1,2,3},   
 (8) 
where:  
 
( )
( )
( )
3 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2 1 0 2 0 2 21 1
3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 2 3 2 1 0 3 0 3 31 1 32 2
1 0,
2 ,
3 .
it
it it i i i i i
it it i i i i i i
V
V x c c x w
V x c c x w
β γ λ α κ δ ε
β γ λ α κ δ ε δ ε
=
= + + + + +
= + + + + + +
 
The parameters of interest which appear in the conditional probabilities are therefore 
( )0 1 1 3 3 0 00 0 1 2 1 2, , , , , , , , , , , ,j j j j jk k k k k k kα α λ κ κ β γ δ δΚ Σ ∆ ∆  with j=2,3 and k=2,3. The parameters 
0 0
1 2 1 2( , , , )j jk kδ δ∆ ∆  are the loadings of the individual specific component in the conditional 
densities/probabilities and capture the dependence between the dependent variables and 
the unobserved individual specific unobserved components.  
17 
 
Of particular interest is the interpretation of the sign and magnitude of the parameters 
3 3 3
21 31 32, ,δ δ δ  in the conditional density of the repayment/default decisions. Recall that we 
assumed that the components of iε  are uncorrelated; this is however only a matter of 
presentation. Indeed, we are always able to define the parameters 331δ  and 332δ  as functions 
of an unrestricted parameter 3δ  and a correlation coefficient ρ  as shown by Equation (9): 
 3 331δ δ ρ=  and ( )1/23 3 232 1δ δ ρ= − .       (9) 
The term 3 331 1 32 2i iδ ε δ ε+  can then be written as ( ){ }1/23 22 11i iδ ε ρ ρε− +  and the term in 
braces is then a normal variate correlated, by construction, with 1iε . We therefore have the 
correspondence:  
3 3 3
31 32
3 3 3
31 32
3 3 3
31 32
3 3 3
31 32
0, 0 0, 0;
0, 0 0, 0;
0, 0 0, 0;
0, 0 0, 0.
δ δ δ ρ
δ δ δ ρ
δ δ δ ρ
δ δ δ ρ
> > ⇔ > >
> < ⇔ < <
< > ⇔ > <
< < ⇔ < >
 
The ratio of 3 331 32δ δ  is an increasing function of ρ  only and therefore its inversion gives an 
estimate of ρ , and given this estimate it is then straightforward to obtain an estimate for 
the parameter 3δ  (applying the delta method to the transformation given the precision for 
3
31δ  and 332δ  will provide an easy way to obtain the precision for ρ  and  3δ ). 
The difficulty with the estimation of these kind of models resides in the fact that the 
individual specific effect are not observed, and therefore the observed likelihood is derived 
from the latent likelihood described above by integrating out the individual specific effects. 
This observed likelihood is potentially difficult to evaluate (and therefore optimise), since it 
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requires to integrate a product of terms over the multidimensional density of the 
unobserved component. Instead of taking this direct route, we adapt the EM algorithm 
described in Train (2008), which is used in the case of the estimation of discrete mixtures to 
the case where the distribution of the unobserved component is known in order to obtain 
the maximum likelihood estimates. The advantage rests in the fact that both the E-step and 
the M-step are relatively straightforward in our case, and that in particular the M-step only 
requires the maximisation of the sum of standard (concave) logit likelihoods and of the 
likelihood for a multivariate normal variable, weighted by quantities which are directly 
calculated from the usual normal quadrature abscises and weights and the complete latent 
likelihood (see the appendix for some details).  The precision of our estimates is calculated 
from the latent likelihood used in the EM algorithm using the results derived in Oakes 
(1982) and adapted to this case in Lanot (2003). 
4. DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The Data 
The data covers 100,000 mortgage contracts, and when constructed as a panel contains 
approximately two million observations (individual x time points). The mortgages were 
issued by a single US originator operating in the UK non-conforming residential mortgage 
market, but the pools also contain some prime and near prime debt. These issues remained 
the property of a major global investment bank with which one of the researchers 
undertook collaborative work. The research is subject to confidentiality agreements, and as 
such the identity of the data source cannot be disclosed3.  
                                                          
3
 Confidentiality is maintained by not estimating models on particular tranches of securitized debt, but rather 
incorporating the whole issue for analysis. Though much of the data is now in the public domain the absence 
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The mortgages are classified by issue and there were two issues per year from January 2003 
to May 2006, offering eight issues over four years (labelled 103, 203, 104, 204, 105, 205, 
106, and 206). The data was collected by issue rather than by the tranches of loans 
packaged into different securities. For example, the January 2003 issue (103) is a mortgage 
portfolio available in eight tranches but we were not given the means to identify these. The 
data covers the full range of types of loan that were securitized, including fixed rate, 
discounted interest rates, buy to let and self certified mortgages.  
The data was reduced by removing the comparatively small number of prime and near 
prime loans (0.0789 and 0.0432 of total observations respectively) concentrated in 
particular issues. Buy to let mortgages (0.0842 of observations but with 0.508 of buy to let 
also prime loans) were also excluded so that the sample included only first lien loans on 
owner occupied property. Given the magnitude of the data set, and the difficulties of 
achieving convergence with the econometric models used, the data was broken down into 
four sub samples. Sample 03 contains issues 103 and 203, those for 2004 are in sample 04, 
2005 sample 05 and 2006 sample 06. Using these year by year samples assisted estimation 
and allowed a comparison of changes in parameter estimates and unobserved 
heterogeneity for mortgages issued and pooled over different periods of time.  
Reference to the descriptive statistics by sample shown in Table 1 reveals that there is 
significant variation in the representation of different types of contract across and within 
issues. In particular the number of self-certified mortgages is significantly higher in the 04 
sample. The proportion of fixed rate mortgages also increases in samples 05 and 06 
compared to 03 and 04. Variations in contract terms increased significantly for later issues 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of dates of redemption and repossession on investor reports means that the timing of exits from the pool 
cannot be reconstructed. Therefore public domain data is not fully useable beyond May 2008. 
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(samples); for example issue 203 has 49 different contracts and by issue 106 this has 
increased to 639. Insofar as different types of mortgage exhibit differences in loan 
performance then mortgage pools and their tranches of securities will also differ. The 
incidence of types of contract, across the issues/samples, led to low representation of some 
contracts, or co linearity problems such that not all contract choices could be modelled with 
each issue. This was not a problem as each contract choice could be modelled within at least 
one sample. 
The investment bank selected the loans of this particular mortgage originator for analysis. 
Therefore there is concern that the pools may be subject to selectivity bias. Each of the 
issues used in the research originally had a triple A credit rating from Standard and Poor and 
Moody’s, with an Aaa from Fitch. By March 2009 the ratings of some of the issues had fallen 
to BBB and BBB-. Though the data was from an originator in the top decile of average loan 
performance there was considerable variation by issue and between the yearly grouping of 
issues.  This variation in performance can be seen in Figure 1 and Figure2 which show 
conditional prepayment and conditional default rates by issue. It is also the case that the 
legitimacy of credit ratings of AAA rated debt can be disputed (Lupica, 2008; Rosengren, 
2010). 
Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 
Conditional Prepayment Rates and Conditional Default Rates by Issue 
We compared the default rates observed in our data with the mean and standard deviations 
of monthly repossession rates for 160 issues from 26 mortgage originators, evaluated by the 
same credit rating agency as the pools studied here. The comparison covered a period of 
twenty four months since the mortgages were pooled. The mean value for all issues was 
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0.81% with a standard deviation of 1.15%.  The mean values for all the samples were within 
one standard deviation of the overall mean (0.60, 0.29, 0.75, and 0.70 for sample 03 to 
sample 06 respectively). Earlier dated pools performed better than those issued at a later 
date introducing some significant variation. Similar results were obtained for comparisons 
made at twelve and eighteen months.  We conclude that the issues used in estimation can 
be taken as a “representative” sample, though not indicative of the worst performing 
subprime pools. 
Variable Definitions and Measures 
Empirically it is important to assess how far the call option to prepay and the put option to 
default are ‘in the money’.  Given that the value of embedded options is a complex function 
of stochastic variables then it is difficult  to measure precisely the intrinsic value of an 
option; and so ‘indirect’ measures are used to evaluate the likelihood of the call or put  
option being ’in the money’. We follow Pennington-Cross and Chomsisengphet (2007), and 
use an estimate of the current loan to value ratio (currentlv) on a mortgage holder’s 
property to represent the extent to which the put option is ‘in the money’. The more likely 
that the put option to default is ‘in the money’ (negative loan to value ratios) the higher the 
probability of a household defaulting on the mortgage debt. The descriptive statistics for 
this and other variables are given in Table 1.  
 Insert Table 1 
To indicate the extent to which the call option is ‘in the money’ we again follow Pennington-
Cross and Chomsisengphet and use the change in interest rates since the date of origination 
(libor change). Given that the typical index rate for subprime mortgages is  3 month Libor 
we use the Libor index as the representative rate. For the UK it is expected that 
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endogenously determined financial behaviour is more likely in the case of prepayment than 
default, so as a further measure of the value of a call option to prepay the standard 
deviation of Libor (stdlibor-a moving standard deviation over 12 months) is included as an 
independent variable4. It is expected that the call option to prepay has a higher value when 
interest rate volatility is high and therefore there is an incentive to keep the option, the 
likelihood of prepayment then being less.  
The empirical specification also includes variables that represent exogenous payment 
shocks that might influence default and prepayment. One measure of this is the interest 
rate shock, which is the change in the actual interest rates paid since the date of origination 
of the contract (actual_shock). There is no data on incomes which can be used with 
mortgage payments to represent the ability to pay. Given the absence of such data then the 
interest rate shock is used as a proxy for this, with larger shocks being more likely to lead to 
difficulty in paying. This may then lead to default, or prepayment to seek out discounts and 
cheaper rates. We also control for the general level of interest rates by including the current 
level of Libor (libor). 
The data set does not contain indicators of personal characteristics, and to some extent the 
influence of these variables is attributed to unobserved heterogeneity in the samples. One 
variable that may proxy credit worthiness is the original loan to value ratio (Pennington-
Cross and Chomsisengphet, 2007). This may also proxy the nature of the household balance 
sheet and its riskiness (Harrison et al, 2004).  Though some studies have included both the 
current loan to value ratio and the original level of gearing in the same specification 
                                                          
4
 The period exhibits a continuous increase in nominal house prices and low levels of volatility and negative 
equity (stats). For this and the other reasons stated in the text exercising the option to default is considered 
less likely than exercising the option to prepay.  
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(Pennington-Cross and Chomsisengphet, 2007), a high degree of correlation between these 
two measures can be problematic. The research reported here addresses this problem by 
including the initial size of mortgage (log initial loan balance) and the value of the property 
at the date of origination of the mortgage (log initial house value) as independent variables. 
Purchasing a more expensive property and having a larger absolute size of loan is also a 
means of overcoming the prudential lending constraint of a maximum loan to value ratio 
(Brueckner, 2004) and may therefore increase the risk of facing payment difficulties at some 
point of time. 
The key characteristics of mortgage contract design are indicated by dummy variables. Thus 
we have indicator variables to represent the choice of a fixed rate mortgage (fixed=1), and a 
discounted mortgage (discounted=1); mortgages with the standard variable rate or Libor are 
excluded for identification. Self-certification is also indicated by a categorical variable 
(selfcert=1). The review of previous research suggested that the sign on discount would be 
positive for both default and prepayment with the estimated parameter on discount being 
larger than that for fixed. Self- certification is taken as an indicator of information 
asymmetry and adverse selection and selfcert=1 is expected to lead to higher defaults and 
prepayments.  
A further significant feature of mortgage design is the existence of the interest reset date on 
which discounts, or periods during which the rate of interest has been fixed, end. A dummy 
variable (revert) is used to represent the current mortgage month if it is within the period 
prior to the reset date (revert=1). Following (Ambrose et al, 2005) it is expected that both 
defaults and prepayments will be higher in the post reversion period. Defaults may increase 
because the increase in the interest rate leads to a payment shock that was not fully 
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considered when the mortgage was taken out, that is consumers may have been myopic 
(Miles, 2004). Prepayments may increase because post reversion the call option is more 
likely to be ‘in the money’, or households may simply be augmenting their cash flow by 
seeking cheaper alternative mortgage deals.  
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The estimates for most parameters show consistent sign and magnitude across the four 
samples5. Irregular cases are discussed later on. We look first of all at the parameter 
estimates for those variables which identify features of mortgage contract design and 
discuss these separately for default and then refinancing behaviour. The results are then 
evaluated with respect to the time varying variables that largely represent the options 
embedded in the mortgage and/or reflect exogenous payment shocks and affordability. The 
parameter estimates for each of the four samples are reported in Table 2. The estimates 
represent shifts in the baseline hazard which is measured by  time out from the date of 
origination of a mortgage (log of months).  
Insert Table 2 
Mortgage Contract Design 
With respect to mortgage contract design the likelihood of default is increased by self-
certification (selfcert=1). However, a discounted mortgage (discount=1) reduces the 
likelihood of default. There are no statistically significant effects on early repayment or 
default for holding a fixed rate mortgage (fixed=1). The sign and significance of selfcert is 
consistent with higher default rates. The information problems and adverse selection that 
                                                          
5
 For estimation purposes the data has been standardised with mean zero and a standard deviation of one.  
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accompany the use of self-certified mortgages are a likely explanation for this observed 
pattern. The lower likelihood of default that accompanies holding a discounted mortgage 
reflects the favourable impact of teaser rates on affordability.  
Default is found to be more likely the larger the original loan (log initial loan balance) and 
the lower the original house price (log of initial house value); these two variables have the 
largest parameters (5.1186 and 4.2209 respectively in Sample 03). While larger loans might 
reflect a good credit rating they also bear higher servicing costs and this may explain the 
higher likelihood of default indicated by our estimates. A low purchase price for a property 
(low value) may reflect other factors such as occupational status and wealth, but also 
indicates the possibility of less absolute value to use as collateral for further borrowing; 
liquidity constrained households with little or no equity in their property may have their 
borrowing constrained in the non housing loan market.  
The likelihood of prepayment is increased when selfcert=1  and with discount=1 . One 
possible explanation  is that the higher rates of interest on self-certification may lead to 
risky borrowers, who do not disclose their incomes and who gradually repair their credit 
records, eventually seeking less expensive deals in the prime lending sector, or with a new 
subprime lender. There is also significant selectivity attached with those choosing 
discounted mortgages. Holders of discounted mortgages who may be cash constrained may 
have a greater incentive to shop around for other teaser rates. 
The likelihood of refinancing is also increased when log  initial loan balance is  large, and 
when log initial house value is low; once again these exhibit the largest parameter values 
(0.4662 and 0.6191 respectively in Sample 03). Mortgage holders with larger loans can make 
higher absolute savings from searching for new mortgage deals. Households with lower 
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valued houses may have less equity than those with higher valued properties, and therefore 
seek the release of cash through seeking more competitive mortgage deals, rather than 
through further borrowing. Again, the results are compatible with an emphasis by 
households upon cash flow and affordability. 
The existence of prepayment penalties and a date at which the favourable contract rates 
revert back to the higher index interest rate are other important features of mortgage 
contract design. The dummy for post reversion decisions (revert=1) was not statistically 
significant in the default equations. Thus the increase in mortgage payment did not induce 
default. This results in part because of the increase likelihood in the competing risk, i.e. 
prepayment. The positive and significant coefficient on revert in the prepayment equations 
signals the possibility that an increase in the required mortgage payment induced re-
contracting.  
Insert Figures 3.a to 3.d 
Hazard and Sub Hazards by self certification and reversion=1 
Figures 3.a and 3.b illustrate the effects of self cert upon the hazard rates and sub hazard 
rates for default (3.a) and prepayment (3.b). The estimates are based on the characteristics 
of the longest surviving observation that can be found in Sample 03. The simulations plot 
the reaction to the path of time varying variables such as Libor and are based upon the 
choice of a fixed rate mortgage (Fixed=1) prior to reversion. The hazard and sub hazard 
curves for default are shifted markedly upwards by the presence of self certification and 
significantly but less so for prepayment. 
Figures 3.a and 3.b incorporate two alternative ways of measuring the risk in the population 
of exiting at a point of time t. The Hazard schedule depicts the ‘cause specific hazard’ where 
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the population at risk (the risk set) contains survivors from all causes of exit up to a given 
time t. The sub-hazard differs from the hazard in so far as the relevant risk set includes 
those who have exited using any exit route other than the one being analysed, in addition to 
the survivors up to time t. For example, the sub hazard for default will have those 
individuals who prepaid their mortgage included in the risk set (see Fine and Grey, 1999; 
Lau, Cole and Gange, 2009). Hence the cause specific hazard measures the rate of exit at 
time t for a given cause given survival so far, while the sub-distribution hazard measures the 
exit rate at time t, but conditions both on survival up to time t and on the possibility that 
some individuals who have not survived up to t may have been at risk of the specific cause 
at time t. Qualitatively the impact of self certification is the same for prepayment and 
default though in the case of default the sub hazard schedules are much lower than the 
hazards and the rate of exit through default now fall away after twenty eight months.  
Option Theoretic and Affordability Considerations  
The current (i.e. measured at time t) loan to value ratio (currentlv) is used to proxy the 
extent to which the put option to default is ‘in the money’ with the expectation is that its 
associated parameter will have a negative sign. For default this variable is not statistically 
significant at the 5% level in three of the samples. Given, that UK mortgages are debt with 
recourse then there is less likelihood of observing ruthless default in the United Kingdom 
than in the United States mortgage market. Other parameter estimates suggest that 
affordability may be a more critical issue for default than endogenous financial calculation. 
For example, the extent to which interest payments changed since origination of the 
mortgage contract (actual_ shock) has a positive and statistically significant effect on the 
likelihood of default.  
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Change in Libor since origination is the proxy for the extent to which the call option to 
prepay is ‘in the money’. The parameter estimates for this variable (liborchange) are not 
consistent across the four samples. The earlier samples Sample 03 and Sample 04 do have a 
statistically significant negative sign but has a positive effect in the two subsequent samples. 
The variable stdlibor provides a further test of the option theoretic explanation of 
refinancing behaviour. In this case the expected negative sign is found in Samples 05 and 
Sample 06 but the parameters are positive and statistically significant in Sample 03 and 
Sample 04. Thus the results for testing the option theoretic explanation of prepayment 
behaviour are ambiguous.  The typically larger coefficient on actual_shock across samples, 
compared to that for libor change ( 0.7721 and -0.1858 respectively in Sample 03) and the 
lack of statistical significance of  libor change again suggests the importance of affordability. 
There are also possible exogenous shocks on prepayment behaviour. Large payment shocks 
may induce cash constrained borrowers to seek better deals. The change in interest 
payments on the mortgage since the origination of the debt (actual_shock) has a positive 
and statistically significant effect upon the likelihood of prepayment. 
Those results where the estimates are inconsistent in sign across samples involve time 
dependent variables, in particular those variables reflecting upon the option theoretic 
interpretation of household mortgage choices. The inconsistency may be the result of 
complex interactions with mortgage contract features for which we do not control; 
alternatively households and/or credit market conditions may differ across the samples.  
Credit market conditions deteriorated throughout 2007 and up to mid 2008. During this 
period Libor increased markedly, and with it mortgage rates, reflecting changed market 
perceptions of risk. Volatility in this case is likely to indicate the several rises in Libor which 
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corresponded with a marked reduction in contracts available for refinancing. Though the 
four samples all have lives which extend into 2008, later issues have more mortgages that 
are likely to be affected by these changes. Samples 05 and 06 have a positive sign on libor 
change suggesting that higher interest rates induced a search for contracts with lower rates 
to minimise payments. There is a negative sign on stdlibor implying that tightening credit 
market conditions reduced prepayments, possibly through less competitive deals being 
available and/or access to mortgage finance being rationed. These results suggest the 
importance of affordability and ease of access to mortgage finance driving prepayment 
decisions6.  
Table 3 summarises the observed signs on the estimates of unobserved heterogeneity and 
the implied correlation between these estimates for each equation (B1D, B1R, B2R). The 
first point to note is the consistency of sign across the four samples. The sign on B2R implies 
a negative correlation between the unobserved components of default and prepayment so 
that a reduction in the likelihood of prepayment increases the likelihood of default. This is 
compatible with the perception that the latter part of 2008 stopped credit impaired 
households from improving their mortgage terms and thus increasing the risk of 
delinquency and mortgage default.  
Insert Table 3 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Comparisons were made between simple logit estimates using the type of exit as the dependent variable 
with a logit with unobserved heterogeneity. There were no significant changes required in the interpretation 
of parameter estimates though controlling for unobserved heterogeneity did increase the size of parameter 
estimates.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
This paper considered whether the variety of mortgage contract designs that were 
securitized explains the performance of subprime securities, and their supposed 
idiosyncratic behaviour. A model was estimated based upon the competing risk of mortgage 
defaults and prepayments controlling for individual unobserved heterogeneity. The 
unobserved individual specific factors were modelled in a flexible general form, allowing for 
their influence upon the initial choice of contract type (for example self certification; 
discounted; fixed). The mixing of a large number of different types of contract into pools of 
securitized subprime loans may be one reason for their supposed wide variability in risk and 
return, and presumed unpredictability. The pools of mortgages had different proportions of 
contract type and an increasing variety of contract terms. Without any assessment of the 
impact of these contract variations, particularly self-certified/low or zero documentation 
mortgages, it is not surprising that performance might be viewed as ‘idiosyncratic’.  
The significance and interpretation of the impact of mortgage contract design on loan 
performance depends upon whether mortgage choices can be seen as the exercise of 
embedded call and put options, or as empirically determined by exogenous shocks and 
factors influencing affordability. The estimation suggested that treating mortgages as 
embedded option contracts did not explain the default and prepayment behaviour of the 
sample. Given this then the impact of reversion periods, the information asymmetry and 
adverse selection associated with self-certification- and only fixing interest rates on 
mortgage contracts for short periods- largely operated though their impact upon 
affordability. These affordability issues resulted in adverse effects on default and generated 
highly active amounts of prepayment for periods where contract choices were plentiful.   
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There is little evidence, in the samples analysed here, of significant variations in unobserved 
heterogeneity between pools of mortgages. The main differences in mean loan performance 
between securities are most likely to arise from compositional effects resulting from having 
different proportions of contracts with different features. There was an observed change in 
the behaviour of later pools of debt, possibly arising from the change in credit market 
conditions which restricted refinancing by liquidity constrained households. To the extent 
that these considerations and unobserved heterogeneity were not taken into account when 
pricing securitized bonds then the behaviour of these pools would appear idiosyncratic. 
Thus securitized subprime loans may be given meaningful valuations on bank a balance 
sheet; that is if the behaviour resulting from the mix of mortgage designs used in the 
securities is better understood.  
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Appendix 
In this appendix we describe the E-step and the M-step of the optimisation algorithm we 
use to estimate the parameters of the model. 
To simplify this presentation we express the complete latent likelihood for the ith 
observation as  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2L , ,i iLθ θ ε ε φ ε φ ε= ,      A.1 
where ( )1 2, ,iL θ ε ε  is the likelihood of observation i given ( )1 2,ε ε  and where ( )φ ε  is the 
normal density function. In principle the observed likelihood is deduced from A.1 by 
integrating the complete latent likelihood over the range of ( )1 2,ε ε : 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2, ,i iL L d dθ θ ε ε φ ε φ ε ε ε= ∫∫     A.2 
Instead of considering the continuum of possible values for ( )1 2,ε ε  we limit ourselves to H 
values for iε , say { }1 2, , ..., He e e  and we associate with each couple ( )',h he e  a positive weight 
( ), 'p h h  such that ( )
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and the weights ( ), 'p h h  from the Gauss-Hermite quadrature abscissas and weights for a 
given H (see Press et al., 1986, for an introduction and Abramowitz and Stegun, 1964). We 
therefore approximate A.1 with  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
'
. '
'
1...
' 1...
L , ,
, , , '
, , , '
i
i i
i h h
h h
i h h
h H
h H
L
L p h h
L p h h δ
θ θ ε ε φ ε φ ε
θ ε ε
θ ε ε
=
=
=
≈
= ∏
     A.3 
 for some h and h’, where we define ( ), 'i h hδ  to be equal to 1 if observation i is of type 
(h,h’)  and 0 otherwise. In effect we augment the observed data with ( ), 'i h hδ  the (latent) 
“type“ of each individual observation. From A.3, the (approximate) latent log-likelihood can 
now be written as  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
'
1...
' 1...
lnL , ' ln , , ln , 'i i i h h
h H
h H
h h L p h hθ δ θ ε ε
=
=
≈ +∑    A.4 
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For some values for the parameters, say χ , the EM algorithm process first (Expectation 
step) by calculating the Expected latent log-likelihood given what is observed (which we 
represent by O
i
)  
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
'
1...
' 1...
E lnL | ln ;
E , ' | ln , , ln , '
i i
i i i h h
h H
h H
O L
h h O L p h h
χ
χ
θ θ χ
δ θ ε ε
=
=
≡ 
 
≈ + 
 
∑     A.5 
where [ ]E | iZ Oχ  evaluates the conditional expectation of a random variable Z given Oi and 
evaluated with the distribution parametrised by the vector χ . The key to A.5 is the fact that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
' '
E , ' ln , , | E , ' | ln , ,i i h h i i i i h hh h L O h h O Lχ χδ θ ε ε δ θ ε ε=        (given the type (h,h’)  
the value of the log-likelihood ( )1 2, ,iL θ ε ε  is constant given Oi. In the present case since we 
specify that ( )φ ε  is the standard normal distribution, the weights ( ), 'p h h  and abscissas 
{ }1 2, , ..., He e e  are known (for any given H)  and don’t need to be estimated (this would be 
the case if instead we assumed that the joint distribution ( )1 2,ε ε  was unknown. Then the 
present EM algorithm could be amended to estimate this unknown joint distribution). 
Hence we can evaluate ( )E , ' |i ih h Oχ δ    from the value of ( )'ln , ,i h hL θ ε ε  for all types 
  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
'
'
, '
, , , '
E , ' | , ';
, , , '
i h h
i i i
i k k
k k
L p h h
h h O h h
L p k kχ
χ ε εδ pi χ
χ ε ε
= ≡ 
  ∑   A.6 
 
The second stage (Maximisation Step) we maximise with respect to θ  the  Expected latent 
log-likelihood given what is observed  and given some initial value χ  for the parameters. 
This procedure is repeated until convergence, where θ  becomes the next value for χ , that 
is until  
 ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
'
1 1...
' 1...
=arg max , '; ln , , ln , '
N
i i h h
i h H
h H
h h L p h h
θ
χ pi χ θ ε ε
= =
=
+∑ ∑ . A.7 
The EM algorithm has good properties and if it converges it an be shown that it produces 
the maximum likelihood estimator (see Gouriéroux & Monfort,. 1995). The benefit of using 
the EM algorithm arises in practice since the objective in A.7 can be understood as the 
maximum likelihood based on the latent log-likelihood but weighted by the quantities 
( ), ';i h hpi χ  (which are treated as given within each M-step).  
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In our context the latent log-likelihood can be decomposed into the sum of several terms 
each involving a different set of parameters. Hence the M-step is obtained by the separate 
maximisation of each of the “independent” components of the properly weighted latent 
log-likelihood. To illustrate this property assume that we can write: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 2' ' 'ln , , ln , , ln , ,i h h i h h i h hL L Lθ ε ε θ ε ε θ ε ε= +  ,   A.8 
with ( )1 2,θ θ θ=  with 1θ  and 2θ  distinct. Then the M-step is amounts to two separate 
maximisations 
  
( ) ( ) ( ){ }11 1 1 '
1 1...
' 1...
=arg max , '; ln , , ln , '
N
M i i h h
i h H
h H
h h L p h h
θ
θ pi χ θ ε ε
= =
=
+∑ ∑ , 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }22 2 2 '
1 1...
' 1...
=arg max , '; ln , , ln , '
N
M i i h h
i h H
h H
h h L p h h
θ
θ pi χ θ ε ε
= =
=
+∑ ∑ . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics Samples One to Four 
 Sample 03  n=497570 Sample 04  n=515654 
Variable     Mean    Std. Dev.      Mean  Std. Dev 
Exit 2.971532 0.1693367    2.971211    .1728018      
months  2 0.30177 14.45543    18.74752    12.66308        
loantovalue 0.6955786 0.147224   0 .6858394    0.1445353      
selfcert 0.5765159 0.494111  0 .7476021   0 .4343887        
currentlv 0.5311837 0.153348   0 .5505707   0 .1462581   
actual_shock 1.133196 1.085864    1.373973   0 .9628001      
discount  0.8709388 0.335268 0.8820352    0.3225667 
fixed  0.1234459 0.328947 0.1169214    0.3213269 
currentlibor  4.313035 0.581544    4.817942   0 .4355623     
liborchange 0.385928 0.621803    0.8091501    0.4684648      
revert  0.3794903 0.485266  0 .4077017    0.4914077        
stdlibor   0.2107883 0.1059696  0 .2403952   0 .1243599    
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Table 1 cont. 
Descriptive Statistics Samples One to Four (cont.) 
 Sample 05 n=455826 Sample 06 n=465386 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev  Mean  Std. Dev 
Exit   2.974975 .1650379           2.981961  0.1412379 
months  19.49204 15.99471 17.92071  15.84958 
loantovalue 0.6991869 0.14986 0.7314664  0.164162 
selfcert 0 .6167397 0.4861814 0.5950136  0.4908899 
currentlv  0 .584231 0.1713933 0.5975107  0.1858507 
actual_shock 0.5861474 1.060004 0.2322083  0.7776358 
discount 0.4997236 0.5000005 0.3423244  0.474488 
fixed 0.3742437 0.4839275 0.6202851  0.4853164 
currentlibor  4.95956 0.5164024  5.168357  0.6255065 
liborchange 0.0623435 0.5970122   0.4107663  0.8862877 
revert 0.4647256 0.4987547 0.7453705  0.4356532 
stdlibor  0.2083212 0.1276791 0.2629969  0.1319354 
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Table 2 
 
Parameter Estimates: Competing Risk Model With Unobserved Heterogeneity 
 Sample 03 Sample 04 Sample 05 Sample 06 
Default Equation 
 Parameter Std 
Error 
Parameter St 
Error 
Parameter Std 
Error 
Parameter Std 
Error 
          
constant     
-9.9636    
0.8048  
-8.8620    
0.2431  
-10.7801    
0.8021  
-10.3914     
0.8961  
log months          
2.1515   
       
0.6026  
       
2.2422  
        
0.2299  
      
3.9253  
         
0.4897  
       
2.9253  
        
0.4661  
actual_shock          
0.7721  
         
0.2914  
       
0.5830  
        
0.1610  
       
0.3060  
         
0.1241  
        
0.5327  
        
0.0708  
currentlv   -0.2136     
0.2179  
   0.1146     
0.1366  
 -0.0566     
0.1775  
    0.7016     
0.2104  
libor    -0.1257     
0.3565  
   0.2205     
0.1582  
  -1.4480    
0.2885  
   -2.7527     
0.4377  
libor change    -0.1858     
0.3153  
  -0.6101     
0.1566  
   1.2295     
0.3082  
    3.5136     
0.5603  
        revert    0.0613     
0.1085  
  -0.0178     
0.0885  
  -0.1121     
0.0619  
    0.0253          
0.0355  
stdlibor         -
0.0172  
        
0.0803  
    -
0.1426  
         
0.0965  
   -
0.1865  
         
0.1092  
         
0.1116  
        
0.1688  
self cert          
0.3800  
         
0.0934  
- -         
0.2898  
         
0.0595  
         
0.3323   
       
0.0762  
          
discount   
       -
0.3218  
         
0.1531  
   -
0.1164  
        
0.0800  
           -
0.4626  
        
0.0970  
fixed              
0.0725  
        
0.0984  
  
libor mortgage           
0.6211  
         
0.1366  
   -
0.2993  
         
0.1147  
Log initial 
loan balance   
        
5.1186  
         
0.9106  
         
4.0890  
        
0.5342  
        
4.5993  
         
0.6222  
          
2.7639  
        
0.6470  
Log initial 
house value    
      -
4.2209  
         
0.7502  
   -
3.4524  
         
0.4365  
   -
3.6623  
        
0.4899  
    -
2.4259  
         
0.5387  
Repayment Equation 
          
constant    
      -
4.2544  
0.0426         -
4.6005  
        
0.0790  
    -
4.6542 
          
0.0387  
  -
6.1337  
        
0.1616  
log months           
2.0366  
         
0.0947  
         
1.6595  
         
0.1154  
        
1.7099  
        
0.0562  
         
2.2951  
         
0.1395  
actual_shock           
0.3351  
         
0.0354  
        
0.6032  
         
0.0427  
        
0.0611  
         
0.0267  
        
0.8050  
         
0.0475  
currentlv         -
0.0364  
         
0.0523  
   -
0.2094 
          
0.0549  
  -
0.1502  
         
0.0406  
   -
0.2461  
         
0.0659  
libor          -
0.4951 
          
0.0664  
         
0.5855  
         
0.0448  
   -
0.3255  
         
0.0483  
   -
2.0097  
         
0.1414  
libor change          -
0.0318  
         
0.0621  
   -
0.5707  
         
0.0535  
         
0.4871  
         
0.0487  
        
2.4183  
        
0.1572  
        revert         
0.0866  
         
0.0107  
         
0.1376  
        
0.0097  
        
0.2044  
        
0.0076  
        
0.4096  
         
0.0073  
stdlibor           
0.1010  
         
0.0123  
         
0.0450  
         
0.0195  
   -
0.1090  
         
0.0261  
   -
0.1587 
          
0.0392  
self cert           
0.1073  
        
0.0172  
- -         
0.0307 
          
0.0135  
        
0.1952  
         
0.0266  
          
discount   
       -
0.1804 
          
0.0389  
         
0.1104  
         
0.0329  
         -
0.6902  
         
0.0474  
fixed              
0.0906 
          
0.0238  
  
libor mortgage            -
0.0291  
         
0.0500  
   -
0.3924  
         
0.0447  
log initial 
loan balance  
         
0.4662  
         
0.2595  
         
0.6105  
         
0.1396  
         
0.3677  
         
0.0860  
         
0.0029  
         
0.1527  
log initial 
house value 
        -
0.6191  
         
0.1796  
   -
0.6352  
         
0.1089  
   -
0.2445  
         
0.0608  
   -
0.2118  
         
0.0966  
Unobserved Heterogeneity 
             
B1D   
       -
2.0668  
         
0.5984   
   -
1.0956  
         
0.2823  
   -
2.4980  
         
0.4252  
   -
2.1758  
         
0.4766  
             
B1R   
       -
0.7609  
         
0.1633   
   -
1.1409  
         
0.1081  
   -
0.7120  
         
0.0792  
   -
1.1584  
         
0.1519  
B2R  
        0.8974           
0.1590    
       
1.4385  
         
0.1106  
        
0.3908  
         
0.1007  
        
1.3184  
        
0.1809  
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Table 3  Parameter Estimates: Unobserved Heterogeneity 
 Pool One Pool Two Pool Three Pool Four 
B1D <0 <0 <0 <0 
B1R <0 <0 <0 <0 
B2R >0 >0 >0 >0 
r <0 <0 <0 <0 
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